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The Filed Tariff Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of
Deregulation?
Rene Sacasas*
If you will not undo what you have done, that is, kill him whom you have
recovered, desire it not.
Twelfth Night, Act II, Scene I

Three industries - transportation, communications and energy are essential to economic growth and industrial development. Absent a healthy profile in each of these industries, a nation cannot
prosper. Owing to their powerful influence over economic growth,
these industries have been viewed as too important to the nation's
well-being to be abandoned to individual economic interests. Accordingly, our society has treated them differently. We have regulated them.
History supports our decision. Study reveals that barge traffic on
the Nile was regulated by the Pharaohs, and the Romans even regulated the size of the wheels on delivery vehicles operating within
their city limits. During the Middle Ages, millers were required to
grind for all on equal terms and blacksmiths were penalized for
refusing to shoe horses. In England, common carriers were regulated during the reign of William and Mary.
The federal regulation of business in the United States began
with the transportation industry. In 1887, after years of public
complaints regarding inequitable behavior by the railroads, Congress passed the Act to Regulate Commerce. This legislation created the Interstate Commerce Commission ("I.C.C."), the federal
* Rene Sacasas, J.D, Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Miami, Coral
Gables, Florida.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 29:1

government's first independent regulatory agency, and gave it the
power to regulate the practices and rates of the railroads. Included
in the Act to Regulate Commerce were a series of legislative provisions intended to control the discriminatory behavior of the railroads, particularly in the setting of rates. These provisions, which
have as their common law source the notion that a common carrier's rates must be reasonable, evolved into the "filed tariff doctrine."' Although initially imposed upon the railroads, this doctrine was ultimately absorbed into the regulatory law governing
other industries, including the other components of the transportation industry, as well as power 2 and telecommunications.3
1. A "tariff" encompasses rules, regulations and other requirements which must be
met before the prescribed tariff rate applies to the subject transaction. Often, courts refer to
the "filed tariff doctrine" as the "filed rate doctrine" when solely discussing the rate component of a filed tariff. The more universally encompassing term will be used in this article.
2. This article will not review the filed tariff doctrine as it applies to the energy industry. Both the electric power and natural gas industries have unique and extraordinarily complex regulatory structures which would require a detailed individualized examination
outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to show, for background purposes only, that the
filed tariff doctrine is extant within the energy industry.
The doctrine was first applied to the energy industry by the Supreme Court in MontanaDakota Utilities Co. v Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 US 246 (1951). In this case,
two power companies were managed by interlocking directorates and joint corporate officers.
They entered into agreements wherein each company received some of the other's power at
filed rates that the Federal Power Commission determined were reasonable. The companies
separated. Soon thereafter, Montana-Dakota filed suit alleging that as a result of improper
and fraudulent behavior on the part of the interlocking management it had paid unreasonably high rates for the electricity it had received and had been paid unreasonably low rates
for the electricity it had sold. The Supreme Court dismissed their claim and held that:
[Montana-Dakota] can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate,
whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms...
Montana-Dakota,341 US at 251-52. See also, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v Hall, 453 US
571, 577-78 (1981) (federal regulation of natural gas prices).
3. The first venture of the federal government into the regulation of the telecommunications industry, section 7 of the Mann-Elkins Act was passed soon after AT&T's power
over the marketplace had been consolidated in the early 1900's. 36 Stat 539 (1910). This
legislation, actively supported by AT&T, declared telephone and telegraph companies to be
common carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("I.C.C."). Chap 309, § 7, 36 Stat 545 (1910). Consequently, it imposed upon these carriers
the duty to provide service on request at just and reasonable rates, without unjust discrimination or undue preference and the I.C.C. was given jurisdiction to enforce these obligations.
36 Stat 539 (1910). The Mann-Elkins Act, however, did not subject the telecommunications
companies to the broadened I.C.C. tariff regulatory jurisdiction imposed upon the railroads.
See, Western Union Tel. Co. v Esteve Bros., 256 US .566, 573 (1921) (all common carriers
are subject to the anti-discrimination principle, but differences exist between railroads and
telecommunications carriers as to their relationship with the I.C.C.).
In 1920, regulation was enlarged. The Transportation Act increased the I.C.C.'s power to
enforce the anti-rebate provisions of the statute against the telecommunications industry,
but left the overall regulation of telecommunications common carriers virtually unchanged.
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During the last decade, a tension developed between two public
Chap 91, 41 Stat 456 (1920). This describes the state of telecommunications regulatory law
when Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934. 47 USC § 151-609 (1976).
This legislation created the Federal Communications Commission ("F.C.C.") and vested it
with jurisdiction over the entire telecommunications industry. Many provisions of the 1934
Act were carried forward almost verbatim from the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, including the
previously applicable prohibition against unjust and unreasonable discrimination. The essential component elements of the filed tariff doctrine were also carried forward as section
203 of the Act required that tariffs be filed with the F.C.C., that the F.C.C. and the public
be given 30 days notice of any proposed change, and that no charge be demanded or collected, refunded or remitted, or any service rendered, except in accordance with a filed
tariff. 47 USC § 203(c). Further, the F.C.C. was given two specific powers with respect to
tariffs. In section 204, the F.C.C. was authorized, either after a complaint or on its own
initiative, to conduct a hearing concerning the lawfulness of a filed tariff, and pending the
completion of that hearing, to suspend its operation for no more than three months. 47 USC
§ 204, as amended, Pub L No 94-376, 90 Stat 1080, § 2 (1976) (increasing period of suspension to five months). If at the end of three months the hearing had not been completed, the
carrier-initiated tariff would go into effect. In section 205(a) the F.C.C. was authorized, after
the hearing, "to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge. . . to
be thereafter observed, and what classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair,
and reasonable to be thereafter followed.
... 47 USC § 205(a).
A recently decided case sustaining the doctrine posed a difficult choice for the D.C. Circuit: extending the protection of consumer interests or reaffirming the basic tenets of the
filed tariff doctrine. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v F.C.C., 836 F2d 1386 (D C Cir 1988). Factually, American Tel. & Tel. Co. v F.C.C. was a straight forward case. The F.C.C. adopted a
rule, the "refund rule," requiring carriers to refund all revenues they collected from consumers which exceeded their permitted target rate of return on capital set by the Commission.
AT&T and others argued that the rule violated the Communications Act and constituted an
arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court
agreed that although the Commission has the power to prescribe the rate of return to be
incorporated into the carriers rates, the rule under review was inconsistent. with the agency's
other rate of return requirements.
In a passionately worded concurring opinion, Judge Starr viewed the agency's actions as
more insidious:
[I]t is apparent that the refund rule that the Commission advances here does
clear violence to the values of stability and predictability that Congress so carefully
enshrined in the Communications Act. In the Commission's Orwellian world carriers
are no longer able to rely on filed rates; instead, they go about their business in constant jeopardy of being forced to refund enormous sums of money, even though they
complied scrupulously with their filed rates. The Commission, inspired by its own
victory in Nader, has turned the regulatory world upside down. . . This goes too far.
We should limit the Commission to its not insubstantial fruits harvested in Nader,
and avoid wreaking havoc in the communications industry and the previously architecturally sound and sensible law of ratemaking. In this age of deference to the
largely unaccountable organs of government, we must not permit those quasi-autonomous creatures of the political branches to tear as under that which the representatives of the people have seen fit to ordain and maintain for a quarter of the Nation's
history. To do so is a misguided affront to basic principles of republicanism.
Id at 1394, 1396.
The Third Circuit in Essential Communications Systems, Inc. v American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 610 F2d 1114 (3d Cir 1979), in reversing the lower court, held that neither the F.C.C.
nor the state regulatory filed tariff provisions provided an implied exemption from federal
antitrust laws. The court reasoned that since Essential was suing as a competitor and not in

4
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policy positions: the newly emerged desire for the economic deregulation of the transportation industry and the well-established
controls against the excesses of the free marketplace, as represented by the filed tariff doctrine. This article reflects upon that
tension and examines the legislative, administrative and judicial
efforts to reconcile these principles.
THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE-GENERALLY

Simply, the filed tariff doctrine forbids a regulated entity from
charging rates for its services other than those properly filed with
the appropriate federal regulatory authority." An everyday transacthe capacity of a customer for communications services and that the Bell System would not
be required to return any revenues derived under the filed tariff, there was no policy conflict
between the antitrust remedy sought and the anti-discrimination purposes of the filed tariff
rule.
The court analyzed the issue as follows:
AT&T's primary obligation under the 1934 Act is to adhere, in its dealings with customers, to its filed tariffs. That primary obligation is the heart of public utility regulation because if carriers were free to depart from filed tariffs the prohibition against
discrimination among customers could be evaded. However, the filed tariff rule has
little or nothing to do with AT&T's duties under the antitrust laws toward its competitors in the equipment supply business; competitors are not the intended beneficiaries of that rule of public utility regulation. . . If this suit were brought by Bell
system customers for recovery of damages because the filed tariff imposed excess
costs upon them, we would probably have to conclude that the filed tariff doctrine
precluded treble damage recovery under section 4 of Clayton Act. But the filed tariff
doctrine does not confer immunity from antitrust liability generally.
610 F2d at 1121 (citing Keogh v Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 US 156 (1922)). But
see also, Litton Systems, Inc. v American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F2d 785, 820-21 (2nd Cir
1983).
In Nordlicht v New York Telephone Co., 799 F2d 859 (2nd Cir 1986), the issue was less
esoteric. Nordlicht filed a class action suit asserting claims against New York Telephone for
money had and received. Nordlicht alleged that he paid, in U.S. dollars, an outstanding
credit card bill to N.Y. Telephone for phone calls he had made between the United States
and Canada and that N.Y. Telephone had paid the Canadian phone company for the calls in
cheaper Canadian dollars and kept the difference in exchange rates. After reviewing the
service agreement between N.Y. Telephone and the Canadian phone companies and finding
.that N.Y. Telephone had charged Nordlicht the same filed tariff rate it charged all customers using this long distance service, the court neatly disposed of Nordlicht's argument by
ruling that:
NYTel has not inequitably retained his money by collecting an amount greater than
necessary to satisfy his debt with a Canadian phone company. Rather, it has merely
collected a charge according to established United States rates from one of its customers. As the District Court noted, the filed rate doctrine requires NYTel to bill its
phone calls in accordance with its tariffs and prevents Nordlicht from making any
challenge to these rates. . . [Hiow NYTel shares its profits with the Canadian phone
companies is of no concern to Nordlicht.
799 F2d at 866.
4. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, carriers initiate rates and include them in tar-
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tion giving rise to the possible enforcement of the doctrine might
occur as follows:
An interstate motor common carrier, enters into a contract with a shipping
customer to provide transportation freight services for a container of the
shipper's product from Miami, Florida to Denver, Colorado. Because of the
carrier's competitive interest in obtaining this particular shipper's business,
the carrier contracts to provide this service at a rate lower than what the
carrier usually charges other shippers and different than the tariff rate
which the carrier has filed with it's regulatory authority, the I.C.C.

In any other business, this act would be unremarkable and expected. Prices are meant to be adjusted to meet competition in a
free market economy. Regulated businesses, such as the interstate
motor carrier in the example, must dance to a different rhythm. In
the short theoretical case presented, the motor carrier or its successor in interest, frequently its trustee in bankruptcy, may pursue
and recover from the shipper the difference between what it actually charged and the freight tariff rate formally registered with the
I.C.C., the "undercharge." The recovery of this undercharge is permitted notwithstanding any private agreement or contract -between
the carrier and its customer to the contrary. Our hypothetical carrier receives both the benefit of obtaining the client at a contracted
price and collecting the higher rate for its freight transportation
services which the market, arguably, may not have supported when
the agreement occurred. The reverse is also true. If the carrier
charged above the rate filed, the shipper may recover the "overcharge." 5 Such is the power of the filed tariff doctrine.
Historically, Congress and the courts have given forceful reasons
for permitting this apparent unfairness to take place. They have
observed that the public policy foundations of the original Act, its
progeny, and the included filed tariff doctrine are the preservation
of the responsible federal agency's primary jurisdiction over unjust
discrimination in interstate commerce6 as well as the agency's coniffs. 49 USC §§ 10101-11916 (1982 ed) If the Interstate Commerce Commission fails to reject
a proposed tariff within the statute's applicable notice period (30 days for motor carriers
and 20 days for railroads), the tariff becomes effective automatically. 49 USC §§
10762(a)(2)(d), 10762(c)(3)(d), 10762. During the notice periods, the I.C.C. may suspend a
tariff on its own or upon the motion of any interested party. 49 USC §§ 10707 (a), 10708(a).
Again, see also, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v Hall, 453 US 571, 577 (1981); see for example, T.I.M.E. Inc. v U.S., 359 US 464, 473 (1959).
5. See, 28 USC § 1337 (1976 ed and Supp 1990).
6. Under the Interstate Commerce Act a carrier may not charge any person a different
rate for a like or contemporaneous service under substantially similar circumstances, nor
charge a higher rate for short distance transport as opposed to long distance transport over
the same line in the same direction, nor give any undue preference to any person, region,
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trol over the reasonableness of rates, 7 and the assurance that regulated companies charge only those rates of which the appropriate
agency, and the public, have been made aware."
Although renamed and amended over the last one hundred
years, the essential provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce,
which gave legislative bottom to the filed tariff doctrine by prohibiting unreasonable discrimination as to rates and charges by common carriers' and requiring common carriers to adhere to published tariffs,' 0 have been retained and remain in effect."
THE FILED TARIFF DOCTRINE AND THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY

A.

The Railroad Industry
The development of the filed tariff doctrine is inextricably

traffic or territory. 49 USC §§ 10741(a), 10726, 10741(b).
7. The Interstate Commerce Commission is also empowered and has primary responsibility to determine the reasonableness of a proposed tariff's rate schedule. The Act states
that "[a] rate ... classification, rule, or practice related to transportation or service ...
must be reasonable." 49 USC § 10701(a). Further, the Act states that when reviewing the
reasonablesness of a carrier's rates, the Commission ". . . shall authorize revenue levels that
are adequate under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operating
expenses. . . plus a reasonable profit." 49 USC § 10701(e). The I.C.C. has been given wide
latitude by the courts in the exercise of their discretion regarding rate making. See, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v U.S., 345 US 146, 150 (1952) and Texas & Pacific R. Co. v Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 US 426, 440-42 (1907). The I.C.C.'s range of action in this area is prescribed by the common and statutory legal concepts of a "zone of reasonableness." See, U.S.
v Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 294 US 499 (1935). The I.C.C. historically
has used, inter alia, the following standards in determining whether a rate is reasonable and
just: existence of competition; volume of shipments; distance of transport; type of commodity shipped; relationship between the rate proposed and variable cost.
8. The Interstate Commerce Act obligates all carriers to "publish and file with the
Commission tariffs containing the rates for transportation it may provide," as well as provide interstate transportation services only at the rates listed in the tariffs filed with the
I.C.C. 49 USC §§ 10762(a)(1), 10761(a). See for example, City of Cleveland v FPC, 525 F2d
845, 854 (D C Cir 1975) (dicta reversed on other grounds, 453 US 583), and City of Piqua v
FERC, 610 F2d 950, 955 (D C Cir 1979). Deviation from the 'filed rate may result in the
imposition of civil or criminal sanctions against either the carrier or the shipper. 49 USC §§
11902-11904.
9. 49 USC § 10741.
10. 49 USC § 10761(a).
11. The Interstate Commerce Act retained this legislative scheme and requires common carriers to file their rates with the I.C.C. in the form of a tariff, 49 USC § 10762(a)(1)
(1982 ed); prohibits common carriers from transporting goods at rates other than their tariff
rates, 49 USC § 10761(a) (1982 ed); and requires them to treat like customers alike, 49 USC
§ 10741 (1982 ed). The Act and the courts, however, recognize exceptions (i.e., motor common carriers may charge reduced rates for transportation of recyclable materials without
filing those rates in the carrier's tariff). 49 USC § 10733; West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v
Arcata Community Recycling Center, Inc., 846 F2d 1239 (9th Cir 1988), cert denied 109 S
Ct 147 (1988).
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linked to the history of the American railroad industry. Between
1830 and 1870, over 50,000 miles of railroads were constructed in
the United States. During this period, railroad regulation was limited to the court enforcement of the companies' charters and interpretation of common law.12 In some states, railroad commissions
were established, but they exerted little control and had no power
over rates.1 3 Although there was strong anti-railroad sentiment
throughout the nation, no real movement toward control of railroad rates and other practices was seen until several western states
acted upon their citizens' displeasure and passed laws subjecting
railroads to state regulation, including statutorily prescribed maximum freight rates. These state laws, which for the first time directly controlled the freight rates that railroads charged, were energized by, and passed in response to, the historically significant
Granger movement of the early 1870's."4
These Granger laws, however, were not to last. They were soon
repealed as the railroads waged a strong campaign against them
citing their potential harm to business and agricultural interests.
Further, the laws had been quickly and crudely drawn and the
public discovered that many of the statutes' provisions were unsound.1 5 The Granger movement and its concomitant legislation,
however, did not die a quiet death. The Granger laws resulted in a
series of Supreme Court opinions ("Granger cases") upholding the
validity of railroad regulation and providing the basis for our current regulatory system.1
12. Some attempts were made to regulate railroads prior to the 1870's. Early railway
charters, which were grants of authority under which the railroad corporations were organized, contained provisions designed to protect the public interest and schedules of maximum
charges for freight. Charter regulations, however, accomplished little to prevent railway
abuses. Maximum rates prescribed by the charters were generally higher than the railroads
charged and, consequently, rarely acted as a control on rates; nor did they speak to the issue
of discrimination. D. Philip Locklin, Economics of Transportation,pp 211-83 (7th ed 1972).
13. Id.
14. The Granger movement was an agrarian revolt. One of its significant manifestations was an anti-railroad sentiment. The movement was occasioned by a decline in agricultural prices caused by the inflation of currency during the Civil War and the rapid settlement of the West. Farmers in the West believed that the railroads were responsible for
many of their difficulties and complained bitterly that freight rates were too high and that
the railroads discriminated against the "little man." See generally, S.J. Buck, The Granger
Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1913).
15.. Locklin, Transportation,pp 211-83 (1972) (cited in note 12). The Panic of 1873
was possibly the most critical element in the repeal of these statutes. It stopped the construction of railroads and gave substance to the railroads' claim that the Granger laws were
scaring capital away from the railroad business.
16. See, Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113 (1877); although this case did not involve rail-
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The railroads' rapid growth in the West through wholesale extension of lines and a rising public disquiet over the perceived excesses of the industry created a climate for federal regulation of
the railroads during the 1870's and 1880's. In 1874, the Senate's
Windom Committee investigated the industry, cataloged the industry's indiscretions and recommended both government construction of competing railroads and development of inland waterways to combat these problems. Although the recommendations of
this committee were not implemented, the "railroad problem" was
before the American public. In 1886, after a decade of half-starts
at regulatory legislation, a special Congressional committee, the
Cullom Committee, was appointed to make another complete analysis of the railroad question. The Cullom Report, which ultimately
served as the blueprint for Congressional regulation of the railroads, discovered much the same as its predecessor and emphasized the discrimination, as well as rates.1 7
As Congress debated railroad regulation, the Supreme Court
changed the rules of the game. In 1886, it decided in Wabash, St.
Louis and Pacific Ry. Co. v Illinois, 8 that a state could not control
rates on interstate commerce. Prior to the Court's decision in Wabash, it was assumed that a state could regulate the intrastate portion of an interstate shipment of goods. The Supreme Court dismissed that assumption by holding that until the federal
government acted, i.e., passed federal regulatory legislation, the individual state restrictions could not apply to goods in interstate
commerce and such commerce, therefore, remained unregulated.
This unexpected decision mandated congressional action as fully
three-quarters of all United States railroad traffic was interstate in
character and, therefore, not subject to state regulation according
to the Wabash decision.19 Congress moved quickly and passed the
Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887 to fill this vacuum.
The Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887 was the first earnest attempt made by Congress to regulate the railroad business. This
Act's main purpose was subsequently articulated by the Supreme
Court as follows:
.. . to secure equality of rates as to all, and to destroy favoritism, these
last being accomplished by requiring the publication of tariffs, and by
prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates, prefroads, it
17.
18.
19.

was considered the most important among the six cases.
Locklin, Transportation pp 222-23 (1972) (cited in note 12).
118 US 557 (1886).
Locklin, Transportation p 224 (1972) (cited in note 12).
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erences, and all other forms of undue discrimination."0

This landmark piece of federal legislation applied to all common
carriers by railroad engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. It
created and was administered by an independent agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Commission was given jurisdiction over interstate rates charged by the railroads and the railroads were required to make their rates public, file them with the
Commission and adhere to the published tariffs. The legislative
structure for the filed tariff doctrine was in place."
Soon after its passage in 1887, Congress discovered that the Act
required emendation. Flagrant- violations, primarily of the rate
publication and filing provisions of the statute, continued to occur
and Congress determined that penalties for failure to comply with
the Act needed to be stiffened. 2 Consequently, Congress gave the
statute, as well as the filed tariff doctrine, more "bite" by passing
the Elkins Act in 1903 and the Hepburn Act in 1906.11
In 1915, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the applicable statutory provisions, ruled that a passenger who purchased a railroad
ticket at a rate misquoted by the ticket agent did not have a defense against the subsequent collection of the higher tariff rate
filed by the railroad. Justice Hughes, in Louisville & Nashville Ry.
v Maxwell, delineated and gave judicial reinforcement to the filed
tariff doctrine as follows:
20. N.Y.N.H.& H RR v I.C.C., 200 US 361, 391 (1906).
21. For an excellent discussion of the historical development of transportation regulation, especially railroad regulation, see generally, P.S. Dempsey and W.E. Thorns, Law and
Economic Regulation in Transportationpp 7-16 (Quorum Books 1986).
22. As previously outlined, railroads historically loaded their high fixed costs onto
shippers who had poor competitive alternatives and charged lower prices to shippers who
had a favorable position by reason of their size or location. This, we have observed, created
a difference in transportation costs hurtful to shippers who paid high railroad rates and
were competing with shippers who paid low rates. This rate incongruity led to the regulatory scheme in which railroads were forbidden both to price off tariff and to refuse service to
any shipper at the tariffed rate. This regulatory system has been enforced by the filed tariff
doctrine since the turn of the century.
23. The Act's provision requiring the filing of tariffs and their observance, (49 USC §
10761) did not reach maximum effectiveness until 1903 with the passage of the Elkins Act
which provided that tariffs must be observed, strengthened the rules against rebating and
made shippers liable for receiving rebates. 32 Stat 847 (1903). The Hepburn Act passed in
1906, making the assessment and payment of special secret rates a criminal activity, completed the enforcement scenario. 34 Stat 587 (1906).
The courts have given the Act a broad judicial construction and have been diligent in
vigorously attacking the rate discrimination envisioned by the statute. See for example, Armour Packing Co. v U.S., 209 US 56 (1908), U.S. v Koenig Coal Co., 270 US 512 (1926), and
U.S. v Union Pacific R. Co., 173 F Supp 397, 412 (S D Iowa 1959).
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. . . the rate of a carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation
from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travellers are
charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it.
• * * Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed. The rule is undeniably strict, and
it may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has
been adopted by Congress in regulation of interstate commerce in order to
prevent unjust discrimination.2 '

Since 1887, federal regulation of the railroads through the Interstate Commerce Act has gone through three major phases: 1) restrictive regulation of railroads (1887-1919), 2) positive and extended regulation of railroads (1920-1970), and 3) deregulation and
aid to railroads (1970-date). 2 5
The first period reflected the people's strong sentiment for federal regulation of the nation's railroads. This phase saw the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and its progeny. These legislative acts emphasized and were designed to reinforce the procompetition/anti-monopoly regulatory philosophy reflected by and
first articulated in the 1887 Act. During this period, the filed tariff
doctrine was created and woven into the regulatory tapestry of the
railroad industry.2 6
During the second period, however, the public policy intent of
railroad regulatory legislation was broadened. Industry structural
problems encountered during the first World War led to the passage of the Transportation Act of 1920 which recognized the nation's need for a sound national transportation system, accepted
the view that a fair rate of return to the carriers was required, and
began a policy of protecting the railroads from harmful competition by controlling entry into the industry and minimum rates.
The regulatory system moved from an anti-monopolistic model to
one favoring protection of the industry.2" Despite this alteration of
course, the filed tariff doctrine remained in full force and effect.
The current period, one of deregulation, began in 1970 as a re24. 237 US 94, 97 (1915). The "filed tariff doctrine" was administratively enforced by
the Interstate Commerce Commission in its regulation of railroads under the original Interstate Commerce Act. See also, Kansas City Southern Ry. v Carl, 227 US 639, 652-53 (1913);
Poor v Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 12 ICC 418, 421-25 (1907); Southern Pacific
TransportationCo. v Commercial Metals Co., 456 US 336, 352 (1982) (shipper's ignorance

or carrier's misquotation of the applicable rate not permitted as a defense to the collection
of the filed rate).
25. See, M.L. Fair and J. Guandolo, Transportation Regulation pp 26-32 (9th ed
1983).
26. Id.
27. Id. See also, Locklin, Transportation pp 211-83 (1972) (cited in note 12).
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sult of the major economic crisis faced by the United States' railroads and was occasioned by what was perceived to be excessive
regulation. The landmark acts of this era with respect to the railroad industry are the Railroad and Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 197628 and the Staggers.Rail Act of 1980.9 The first

piece of legislation, among other things, initiated the deregulatory
process by giving railroad managers significantly more power and
flexibility over the freight rates they charged. The Staggers Rail
Act continued the process by completely recasting the railroad
freight business. Under the Act, rail carriers were authorized for
the first time to enter into private contract rates which were immune from regulation subject to certain statutory proscriptions,
i.e., no unreasonable discrimination and no impairment of their obligations as common carriers. Further, the Act outlined and set a
public policy agenda of maximum reliance on the competitive
forces within the interstate transportation market. In summary, interstate freight rail rates were deregulated and the carriers were
free to enter into negotiated contract rates for the shipment of
freight as long as they complied with the filing requirements of the
Act.3"

Herein, however, lies the rub. The casual observer might assume
that Congress, in deliberating the passage of the Railroad and Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act and the Staggers Rail Act,
reflected upon and critically examined the latent conflict between
the filed tariff doctrine, an unyielding regulatory scheme based
upon the theory that decontrolled pricing of freight rates inevitably leads to carrier excesses and discrimination, and Congress' new
public policy of railroad carrier deregulation as manifested by
these two legislative acts. Congress, however, notwithstanding
lengthy hearings and debate, did not alter the provisions of the
filed tariff doctrine as it applied to the railroad industry. Despite
the new deregulated "private negotiated contract" rights provided
for the carriers under the Staggers Rail Act, the filed tariff doctrine still lay in wait for both carriers and shippers.
Soon thereafter, the Fifth Circuit in Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R.
28. The Railroad and Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, Pub L 94-210,90
Stat 31 (1976).
29. The Staggers Rail Act, Pub L 96-448, 94 Stat 1895 (1980).
30. Id. Under regulations promulgated by the I.C.C. pursuant to the Staggers Act, a
railroad carrier has to file only two documents: the confidential contract and a contract
summary. The summary, but not the contract, is made available to the public. See, 49 CFR
Part 1039.
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Co. v U.S., a1 made it clear that the filed tariff doctrine was still a
viable regulatory instrumentality. This 1982 opinion, which was
written subsequent to the passage of the Staggers Rail Act, upheld
an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring compliance with tariff symbolization requirements"2 for any changed
rates. Neither the litigating parties nor the Fifth Circuit discussed
the recent statutory activity occasioned by deregulation, but rather
the court reiterated the statutory litany which serves as the bottom
for the filed tariff doctrine.3 If there was any doubt whether the
filed tariff doctrine would survive the railroad deregulation movement and legislation, this decision demonstrated that, at least in
the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine remained untouched. 4
31. 682 F2d 1092 (5th Cir 1982).
32. Aberdeen, 682 F2d at 1092, 1095.
One such regulation governs the symbolization of changed rates, requiring that
[t]ariff publications shall indicate changes made in existing rates, charges, classifications, rules, or other provisions by use of the following uniform reference marks in
connection with each such change:
[mark] or (R) to denote reductions
[mark] or (A) to denote increases
[mark] or (C) to denote changes which result in neither increases nor reductions in
charges
49 CFR § 1310.10(f)(1). As justified by the Commission, these requirements "are designed to
allow tariff users to rely on symbolization to (1) discover changes and (2) evaluate those
changes. Discovery and evaluation are vital to tariff users' rights to timely protest proposed
tariff changes. 44 Fed. Reg. 60123 (1979)." Aberdeen, 682 F2d at 1095.
33. Aberdeen, 682 F2d at 1092, 1094-95. The court stated as follows:
The Revised Interstate Commerce Act (the Act) requires carriers providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission to publish and file with
that agency tariffs containing the rates that are charged to shippers. See generally 49
U.S.C. § 10762. Regulated carriers may collect only the rates that are contained in
tariffs on file with the Commission, see 49 U.S.C. § 10761, and departure from the
filed rate schedule will subject a carrier to civil and criminal liability, 49 U.S.C. §§
11901, 11903. The Commission is empowered to proscribe the form and manner of
publishing, filing, and keeping the tariffs open for public inspection. 49 U.S.C. §
10762(b)(1). However, the Act itself clearly states that newly filed tariffs must
"plainly identify" any proposed rate change and indicate its proposed effective date.
49 U.S.C. § 10762(c)(3). Normally a new tariff will become effective thirty days or, in
the case of railroads, twenty days, after the carrier files it, id, unless the Commission
suspends the proposed rate pending the outcome of an investigation pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 10707(a) or § 10708(a).
As authorized by 49 U.S.C. § 10762(b)(1), the Commission has promulgated regulations prescribing the form in which tariffs are to be published and filed. One such
regulation governs the symbolization of changed rates..
Id at 1094-95.
34. In reaching its conclusion in the case, the court restated the binding precedent
without equivocation:
The filed rate doctrine. . . forbids a regulated entity from charging rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory author-
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In 1984, the Fifth Circuit again revisited the filed tariff doctrine
as applied to the railroad industry. The court in Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. v San Antonio, Texas 5 was asked to consider,
inter alia, whether the City of San Antonio was required to pay a
freight rate for the shipment of coal which had been published and
filed with the I.C.C. The reasonableness of the rate had been in
dispute between the parties for several years. The railroads had
properly filed new tariffs which included the rates .as ordered by a
prior court order and the City still refused to pay, seeking instead
a further stay from the court. The court reviewed the process, ordered the City to promptly pay the. outstanding freight rate due
under the filed tariffs, and reiterated its support for the filed tariff
doctrine by holding that:
• . . the ongoing delay in payment of the rate is inconsistent with the
traditional "filed rate" doctrine. That doctrine is premised on a distinction
between a "legal" rate and a "lawful" rate. The legal rate is the tariff rate
published and filed with the I.C.C. The lawful rate is a legal rate which has
also been determined by the Commission to be reasonable and acceptable
under the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. [Citations omitted.] A railroad is required to charge the legal (filed) rate, and a shipper is
required to pay that rate when due . . .31

The next significant post-deregulation decision applying the filed
tariff doctrine to the railroad industry was Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v Mead Johnson & Co.37 This case involved a quarrel
over rail freight charges for shipments of "milk food liquid" by
Mead Johnson & Co. from its plant in Indiana to its warehouse in
New Jersey. Prior to 1977, Mead Johnson shipped milk food product via Chicago and Buffalo. Several shipments along this northern
route were delayed, and the goods were damaged by freezing. Representatives of the parties met and agreed that Mead Johnson
would ship to New Jersey via Cincinnati, Ohio and Hagerstown,
Maryland. All of the shipments in dispute were made along this
southern route.
Unfortunately for the shipper, the freight tariffs for the southern
route differed from those for the northern route. The northern
route had an approved commodity rate tariff which was lower than
ity. [Citations omitted.] Originally devised as a means of ending discriminatory rebate practices, the doctrine binds both carriers and shippers to pay only the rate on
file in the current tariff...
Aberdeen, 682 F2d at 1101, n.11.

35. 748 F2d 266 (5th Cir 1984).
36.
37.

Southern Pacific, 748 F2d at 273-74.
737 F2d 683 (7th Cir 1984).
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the class rate tariff for the southern route. The railroads, nevertheless, charged Mead Johnson the lower rate, thereby failing to comply with the filed tariff doctrine which required the railroads to
charge the higher rate for the southern route unless a new tariff
was filed and approved. The railroads subsequently sued for the
difference between the rates. The shipper argued that they had
contracted for and paid the rate required by the carrier and it
would be manifestly unfair to permit the railroads to collect the
undercharge. The railroads, arguing the filed tariff doctrine, prevailed and received judgments for the total amount of the
undercharges.3
.The Seventh Circuit upheld the court below. In an opinion resonating with the words written by Justice Hughes some seventy
years previous to this case, the court strongly reaffirmed the preeminence of the filed, tariff doctrine, despite the apparent harsh
result in this particular case wherein the railroads, unquestionably,
received a windfall. The court chided Congress as follows:
Recent legislation moving toward modified deregulation of the railroad industry (involving greater reliance on competitive forces) might suggest the
need for a second look at policies requiring strict adherence to filed tariffs.
[Citations omitted.] Greater rate flexibility,. for example, might seem appropriate where competitive forces are at work and monopoly or [monopolistic]
power has abated. However, Congress has not yet amended the Act to permit greater flexibility in situations like the one before us, and we are unwill39
ing to engage in deregulation by adjudication.

In 1985, the Ninth Circuit got its chance to review the filed tariff
doctrine in the new deregulatory environment in Farley Transportation Co. v Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo.40 In late 1979, Farley filed an anti-trust action against Santa Fe and others, alleging
violations of the anti-trust laws and the Interstate Commerce Act.
Santa Fe counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that Farley owed unpaid freight and other charges. Subsequently, Santa
Fe's counterclaim was amended to include Class 70 tariff charges
arising from Farley's refusal (upon the advice of counsel) to permit
the Trans-Continental Freight Bureau from auditing the records of
shipments made on Santa Fe." The Class 70 rate is equal to ten
38. Louisville, 737 F2d at 684-86.
39. Id at 690 (see note 5).
40. 778 F2d 1365 (9th Cir 1985).
41. The Bureau acts as an agent for railroads "pursuant to tariffs approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Bureau is authorized to audit shippers' records of
shipments on common carriers to ensure that shippers have correctly described the commodity and weight of items shipped and applied the proper tariff. If a carrier or its author-
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times the shipping charge for each bill of lading withheld from inspection. The Class 70 tariff is designed to discourage unlawful
shipping practices and to compel disclosure of freight charge
documentation.
Farley contended that the district court's application of the
Class 70 tariff was arbitrary and unjust as a matter of law; after all,
they were in litigation with the carrier and ultimately did provide
the requested records through court supervised discovery. Unfortunately, Farley ran headlong into the filed tariff doctrine. The court
refused to entertain Farley's argument and held that:
A duly published tariff is binding on the parties and has the force of law.
[Citation omitted.] A tariff must be applied equally to all since any deviation from the lawful rate would involve either undue preferences or unjust
discrimination. [Citation omitted.] Application of a published tariff is required regardless of the intentions of the parties or the equities existing
between carrier and shipper. [Citation omitted.]
Farley nevertheless contends that the Class 70 tariff should not be applied because Santa Fe was not prejudiced by Farley's decision to produce
the shipping records directly to Santa Fe pursuant to court-supervised discovery rather than indirectly to its agent. . . . Farley relies on Glickfield v
Howard Van Lines, Inc. [citation omitted], which states that a tariff should
not "be read or applied in a manner which would lead to an unjust or absurd conclusion." That precept, however, is a general rule of contract construction and is inapplicable unless a tariff is ambiguous. [Citation omitted.] If a tariff is not ambiguous, the parties are bound by its terms, and
aids to construction are irrelevant. In this case, the tariff is straightforward
and unambiguous, and the district court was correct in declining to determine whether its application was arbitrary or unjust.
Farley has failed to provide Santa Fe with timely access to relevant shipping records as required by the tariff. We see no reason to disturb the district court's decision.2

The attempted deregulation of the railroad industry reminds one
of the infamous television commercial for margarine, "If you think
it's butter but its not . . ." Many believed that the [delregulatory
acts were intended to dismantle the rigid filed tariff rate structure
which governed the industry prior to the 1980's. To some degree,
they did. If a shipper and carrier enter into a private contract
which provides for private contract freight rates which are applicable to that particular shipper for a specific product shipped over a
set route, the carrier may file the contract in secret with the I.C.C.
pursuant to the Staggers Rail Act, and feel secure that the contract
ized agent is denied access, then a Class 70 rate tariff is imposed." Farley, 778 F2d at 1368.
42. Id at 1372-73.
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rates will be unchallenged and enforced by the regulatory authority. If, however, the transaction does not have or economically warrant a separate contract, or the carrier forgets to file the contract,
or reverts to old habits and quotes a freight rate based on a previously filed tariff but alters the contract rates to suit the particular
transport deal under negotiation, the circuit courts' recent decisions advise that either the shipper or the carrier may well get bitten by that old bulldog, the filed tariff doctrine.
B.

The Water CarrierIndustry

Government intervention in the water carrier industry was limited during the early years of the nation's existence. No regulation
of rates and trade practices occurred until the passage of the Act
to Regulate Commerce of 1887, and the effects of this Act were
very limited. The Act, despite its limitations, gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission jurisdiction over any carrier engaged in the
transportation of persons or property" .
partly by railroad and
partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for continuous carriage or shipment." For
the next several years, the Commission's control over water carriers was limited to joint rail and water traffic and did not extend to
port-to-port traffic of the water carrier,4 3 although the Commission
was empowered to demand accounts and reports of the carriers
covering their whole operations.4 4
Water carriers were regulated further in the areas of rates and
trade practices by the Shipping Act of 1916."1 This Act created the
U.S. Shipping Board"' and gave it jurisdiction over common carriers by water operating in interstate or foreign commerce on the
high seas or upon the Great Lakes. It excluded, however, important sectors of the industry: (a) contract carriers (those carriers
providing for-hire transportation under private agreements with
shippers by assigning ships to the shipper's exclusive use), (b)
water carriers operating on inland waterways other than the Great
43. In the Matter of Jurisdiction over Water Carriers, 15 ICC 205, 211 (1909).
44. I.C.C. v Goodrich Transit Co., 224 US 194 (1912).
45. The Shipping Act, Chap 451, 39 Stat 728 (1916) codified at 46 USC § 801 et seq.
For example, section 18(b)(3) of the Shipping Act, 46 USC § 817(b)(3), requires carriers by
water in foreign commerce to charge on the basis of their filed rates. However, under the
current statute, filed rates may be amended at any time, even up to 180 days subsequent to
shipment.
46. In 1961 it became the independent regulatory agency known as the Federal Maritime Commission.
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Lakes, and (c) those carriers already under the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission."7
In addition to protecting carriers from unfair competitive practices, the Act contained the following provisions, incorporating the
basic tenets of the filed tariff doctrine:
1. Common carriers by water engaged in interstate commerce were required
to publish and file with the Board their maximum rates. They could not
charge more than their maximum rates and the filed rates could not be
changed unless ten days notice was given. It did not, however, require that
the carriers publish their actual rates.
2. All rates of interstate common carriers by water should be reasonable and
just.
3. Any undue or unreasonable preference to any person, locality ordescription of traffic, or any unjust discrimination was forbidden.' 8

Further regulation occurred, in 1933. As a result of fierce competition in intercoastal trade after the First World War, Congress
passed the Intercoastal Shipping Act'9 to manage this area. This
Act applied to common and contract carriers operating in intercoastal commerce via the Panama Canal. It increased control over
rate-making by requiring carriers to file their actual rates with the
Shipping Board, rather than just filing the maximum rates required under the Shipping Act, and directing that those filed rates
be strictly adhered to by the carriers.
The year 1940 brought another restructuring of the regulation of
the water carrier industry. The Transportation Act of 194050 extended the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction over
domestic water carriers and set up a regulatory system for them,
including the filed tariff doctrine, which was similar to that applicable to the railroads. The Maritime Commission, however, retained jurisdiction over water transportation in foreign commerce
and also over commerce between points in the continental United
States and Hawaii, Alaska, and the various possessions of the
United States."
47. For outstanding historical treatments of the regulation of water transportation see
Locklin, Transportation pp 745-69 (1972) (cited in note 12), and Dempsey, Law and Economic Regulation pp 29-34 (Quorum Books 1986) (cited in note 21).
48. See note 45.

49. 46 USC § 843 et seq (1975 and Supp 1990).
50. 54 Stat 898 (1940).
51. See for example, Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v Federal Maritime Comm'n,
602 F2d 379 (D C Cir 1979) and Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v Valley Freight
Systems, Inc., 856 F2d 546, 548 (3d Cir 1988).
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The original Shipping Acts"2 regulating interstate and foreign
water carriers were modeled on the Interstate Commerce Act.
When asked to review them, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended that these acts "...
should have a like interpretation, application and effect ...
within their own regulatory
area. Disputes arose, however, as to whether a private party had a
cause of action for the recovery of an undercharge. Because the
Shipping Acts contain nearly identical terms to the rate filing provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, which serve as the foundation of the filed tariff doctrine, 5 4 the First and Second Circuits
held, in the following decisions, that water carriers regulated by
these Acts have a private right to recover undercharges from shippers if the carrier failed to charge the filed tariff rate.
In 1932, in Prince Line, Ltd. v American Paper Exports, Inc.,55
the Second Circuit was asked to determine whether a water common carrier engaged in foreign commerce between New York and
the Far East could recover from their shipper client the difference
between their contracted rate with a shipper and their filed tariff
rate, i.e., the "undercharge." Simply, were the Shipping Act's filed
tariff rate enforcement provisions to be interpreted in the same
manner as the Interstate Commerce Act's filed tariff doctrine?
Judge Learned Hand held that:
The statute overrides all such contracts, and imposes a liability upon him
which the carrier may, and indeed, must enforce. Within its own ambit, the
same remedies attend a violation of the Shipping Act, as have been accorded under the Interstate Commerce Act."

52. 46 USC § 801 et seq (Shipping Act of 1916, cited in note 45) and 46 USC § 843 et
seq (Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, cited in note 49).
53.

See, U.S. Navigation Co., Inc. v Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284 US 474, 481

(1932).
54. Section (a) of the Shipping Act, 46 USC § 817, requires common carriers by water
in interstate commerce to "establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, fares,
charges, classifications and tariffs," to charge on the basis of their filed tariffs and to file
said tariffs with the Federal Maritime Commission. 46 USC § 817(a). Filed tariffs, however,
may be amended at any time. Prior to 1988 there was an express proviso that if a carrier
inadvertently fails to amend its tariff before the shipment, it could waive or refund a portion of the charges by filing a new tariff with the Commission and make application for
authorization of the waiver or refund, but the application must have been made within 180
days after the sailing of the vessel. 46 USC 817(b)(3) (repealed 1988) partially replaced by
46 CFR 560 (1989). See also, Roco Worldwide, Inc. v ConstellationNavigation, 660 F2d 992,

993 (4th Cir 1981).
Section 2 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act imposes similar obligations on carriers in intercoastal commerce. 46 USC § 844 (cited in note 49).
55. 55 F2d 1053 (2nd Cir 1932).
56.

Prince Line, 55 F2d at 1056.
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Thirty-four years later, as the specter of deregulation in the
other transportation industries appeared over the horizon, a circuit
court again was asked to pass on the efficacy of the filed tariff doctrine as applied to the water carrier industry. In Maritime Service
Corp. v Sweet Brokerage De Puerto Rico, Inc.,57 the First Circuit
had little difficulty determining that the precedents flowing from
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v Maxwell,58 were applicable to and
binding upon the water carrier industry. Agreeing with the reasoning in and citing Prince Line, Ltd.,59 the court held that the filed
tariff doctrine was grafted upon both Shipping Acts, that carriers
.had a private cause of action to enforce the doctrine and that,
therefore, freight undercharges were recoverable by the carrier
from the shipper.6 0
The Fourth Circuit, however, viewed the issue quite differently.
In Roco Worldwide, Inc. v Constellation Navigation,61 a case decided in 1981, an ocean carrier brought an action against four of its
customers for the difference between the negotiated rates it had
actually charged for transportation services and the carrier's unamended tariff rate. The carrier had expected to amend the filed
tariff rates to conform with the negotiated rates but had negligently failed to do so within the 180 day grace period permitted by
section 18(b)(3) of the Shipping Act. The court held that enforcement of the filed tariff doctrine was inappropriate under the Shipping Act in light of industry practices.6 2 The court held that:
The "filed rate" doctrine simply has no application to that portion of the
shipping business in which tariffs are readily amended to reflect specific
agreements with shippers, and in which such amendments are even author-

57.
58.
59.

537 F2d 560 (lst Cir 1976).
237 US 94, 97 (1915).
Cited in note 55.

60. Further, the First Circuit found that the close parallels between the tariff provisions of the Shipping Act and the Interstate Commerce Act supported a private cause of
action for carriers under the Shipping Act. The court refused to make any distinction between the two Acts merely because the Interstate Commerce Act, unlike the Shipping Act,

contained explicit provisions allowing carriers to recover tariff charges. Maritime Service,
537 F2d at 563. The court noted that the Supreme Court had found an implied private
cause of action in carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act long before Congress enacted
these explicit provisions. Id. Before the enactment of the explicit provisions, the only basis
for construing a private cause of action under the Interstate Commerce Act was statutory
language similar to that found in the present Shipping Act.
61. 660 F2d 992 (4th Cir 1981).
62. Rocco, 660 F2d at 995. Further, the court held that Congress did not intend to
allow carriers to bring private actions under the Shipping Act to remedy deviations from
published tariff rates. Id.
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ized during a period of 180 days after the shipment."

It can be inferred from the court's reasoning that, in its opinion,
the statute's permissive amendment provisions when coupled with
the shipping industry's practice of permitting tariffs to be
amended freely had, de facto, deregulated the industry. Judge
Widener dissented and argued forcefully that he:
. .. doubt[ed] that the custom and practice in an industry is sufficient to
overcome a statutory command. However harsh the application of such a
rule would make the result in this case, permitting a carrier with regulated
rates to deregulate itself by virtue of custom would seem to me to be far
worse..

This set the stage for Sea-Land Service, Inc. v Murrey & Son's
Co., Inc.6 5 In this case, Sea-Land transported a thirty-five foot
shipping container containing billiard tables from Long Beach,
California to Saudi Arabia for Murrey & Sons. The shipment was
performed pursuant to a properly filed Sea-Land ocean freight
tariff. Pursuant to the tariff, the applicable rate for the shipment
was $5,820, and the insurance surcharge was $200. Sea-Land billed
Murrey for $6,020. Murrey paid $3,010 and refused to pay the balance, contending that Sea-Land had contractually agreed to ship
the tables for $3,010. Sea-Land brought an action to recover the
amount remaining under the tariff. The district court entered summary judgment on behalf of Sea-Land and followed the Maritime
precedent, holding that the Shipping Act of 1916, and the case law
interpreting same, provides an ocean carrier a private cause of action to collect freight charges required by a filed tariff. The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Maritime and the dissent filed
in Roco.
Judge Pregerson, speaking for the court, stated:
We do not find the Fourth Circuit's reasoning persuasive. Roco's argument
that carriers are not "special beneficiaries" of the Shipping Act could be
applied as easily to carriers operating under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Although the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act appear to be
designed to run against carriers, courts have traditionally construed that

Act to allow carriers to sue shippers to
the tariffs. [Citation omitted.] Moreover,
ping Act. The requirement that carriers
Federal Maritime Commission prevents
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
824 F2d 740 (9th Cir 1987).

recover the
carriers do
place their
one carrier

charges established in
benefit from the Shiptariffs on file with the
from luring away an-
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other carrier's customers by using surreptitious fee arrangements. 6

This schism among the circuits remains unbreached. The First
and Ninth Circuits have applied the Supreme Court's opinion in a
modern context and have arrived at the same position that Judge
Learned Hand did in 1932: the filed tariff doctrine applies to the
water carrier industry despite the recent private deregulatory activity in the industry. The Fourth Circuit stands alone, echoing
what it perceives to be the deregulatory will of the 1980's. Their
disagreement awaits resolution-in the interim, life goes on.
C.

The Motor CarrierIndustry

In no other regulated industry has the inherent conflict between
the filed tariff doctrine and Congress' shift toward economic deregulation flared more intensely than in the interstate motor carrier
industry. Prior to July 1, 1980, this industry operated in a highly
regulated environment characterized by intricate rules and ritualized protection."' The Motor Carrier Act of 198018 ("MCA") deregulated the industry and forced all its participants, large and
small, into a new world. 9
66. Sea-Land Service, 824 F2d 740, 743 (9th Cir 1987).
67. See, Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat 453 (1935), which brought motor carriers
of property and passengers under the jurisdiction of the I.C.C. In 1935, the Interstate Commerce Act was amended by this Act. This amendment divided the Interstate Commerce Act
into two parts. The original Interstate Commerce Act was labelled "Part I." The Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 was added as "Part II."
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, a product of a lengthy debate regarding the apparent
unfairness of burdening the railroads with regulation while letting the trucking industry run
free, provided that no motor carrier could lawfully operate in interstate or foreign commerce
without a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the I.C.C. Further, it
subjected the motor carrier industry to rate and practice regulation, including the filed tariff
doctrine.
68. The Motor Carrier Act, Pub L No 96-296, 94 Stat 793 (1980).
69. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, deregulated the motor carrier industry in several
ways in an attempt to ". . . promote competitive and efficient transportation services." The
Motor Carrier Act, Pub L 96-296, § 4, formerly codified at 49 USC § 10101(a)(7) (1976 ed,
supp V). In addition to loosening entry controls, see, section 5, codified at 49 USC § 10922
(1982 ed), the MCA also created a "zone of reasonableness" within which carriers can raise
rates without interference from the I.C.C. See, section 11, codified at 49 USC § 10708 (1982
ed). The MCA also permits motor carriers to operate as both common carriers and contract
carriers. See, Pub L 96-296, § 10(b)(1), amending 49 USC § 10930(a) (1982 ed). A contract
carrier transports property under exclusive agreements with a shipper, see, 49 USC §
10102(14) (1982 ed), and the I.C.C. exempted all motor contract carriers from the requirements of sections 10761 and 10762. See, Exemption of Motor Contract Carriersfrom Tariff
Filing Requirements, 133 MCC 150 (1983), aff'd sub nom, Central & Southern Motor
Freight Tariff Assn., Inc. v United States, 757 F2d 301 (D C Cir 1985), cert denied, 474 US
1019 (1985). The I.C.C. has also allowed decreased rates to go into effect one day after the
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Before 1980, the filing of interstate motor carrier tariffs with the
I.C.C. was a routine process except in those few cases where a shipper, protested the rate as being too high. A collectively set tariff
was filed with the Commission by a Motor Carrier Rate Bureau on
behalf of a number of motor carriers subscribing to the tariff, or a
carrier filed its own with the I.C.C., and that was that; unless challenged-a rare event-the tariff went into effect.
Following deregulation, thousands of motor carriers issued their
own tariffs, often tailored to the needs of a particular shipper customer or group of customers. This outcome was expected. Individual, or contract, pricing reflected one of the primary objectives of
deregulation, namely, the achievement of real price competition in
the motor carrier industry.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 may have deregulated the industry and permitted price competition, but it did not abrogate the
filed tariff doctrine as applied to the motor carrier industry. The
old rules still apply. Accordingly, any motor carrier holding I.C.C.
certificates is still required to file their interstate tariffs with the
Commission in order to make those tariffs effective. Failure to file
a tariff results in the carrier being required to charge the previously filed tariff rate, despite what may have been contracted for
by the parties. Given the rate wars resulting from deregulation,
and the pricing concessions made by many motor carriers desperate to generate cash flow, it was inevitable that many new tariffs including many not filed with the I.C.C. - would reflect lower rates
71
than earlier tariffs.
The deregulation-induced interstate motor carrier rate wars produced two results relevant to the filed tariff doctrine. First, these
filing of a tariff. See, Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Rates, 1 ICC2d
146 (1984), aff'd sub nom, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v United States, 773
F2d 1561 (11th Cir 1985).
70. The filed rate doctrine, as applied to the motor carrier industry for the last fifty
five years, basically provides that the freight rate filed with the I.C.C. is the only legal rate
to be charged and bars courts from considering any equitable defenses to a carrier's action
to collect undercharges. During the 1980's, the I.C.C. refused to enforce the filed rate doctrine when a carrier and shipper had negotiated a lower rate for a shipment and the carrier
later attempted to collect the higher filed rate. The I.C.C. took the position that it could
forbid collection of the higher filed rate pursuant to its authority under the Interstate Commerce Act to ensure that all carrier practices were "reasonable." See, 58 USLW 1110 (Jan
23, 1990).
71. It is conservatively estimated that there are currently $30 million in undercharge
claims facing shippers. An interesting article aimed at the practitioner outlines a shipper's
possible defense approach to an undercharge claim. Undercharges Addressed by Logistics
Managers, 30 Transportation and Distribution 40 (August 1989).
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rate wars were the primary cause of several thousand motor carrier
bankruptcies in the 1980's, thus turning loose a horde of bankruptcy trustees looking for assets. Second, the evidence was clear
that in rate war situations, an earlier (filed) tariff was likely to be
supplanted by a subsequent (unfiled) tariff containing lower rates.
This meant that if the filed tariff doctrine was enforced, hefty underpayments were due from shippers who had dealt with now
bankrupt. carriers. 7
As with the railroads and water carriers, the primary focus of the
filed tariff doctrine, as applied to the interstate motor carrier industry, was the prevention of large suppliers and shippers from negotiating "under the table" tariffs which were lower than filed tariffs, thereby undercutting competition from smaller suppliers who
also had to use the highways of interstate commerce to get their
goods to market. As we have seen, the filed tariff doctrine has not
been a "soft" rule. Since codified and interpreted, the courts have
been scrupulous in its application. Recently, the doctrine was given
additional bite. In 1982, with motor carrier deregulation in place
and its concomitant undercharge problems emerging, the Supreme
Court ruled that carriers have ". . . not only the right but also the
duty to recover its proper charges for services performed."' 77 Further, the courts have reemphasized the long-standing rule that this
right to recover the undercharge is not subject to the common law
contract defenses of estoppel or mistake. 4
A review of the federal case law since 1980 reveals that cases
involving motor carrier undercharges fall into the following patterns: 1) when the carrier miscalculates the amount due under the
filed tariff rate applied to the shipper; or-2) when the carrier, inadvertently or by design, fails to file the tariff containing a lower rate
with the I.C.C. as required by statute. The latter omission, as previously stated, is extremely dangerous to the shipper because if the
72. For an outstanding treatment of the economic effects of motor carrier deregulation
see, N.A. Glaskowsky, Effects of Deregulationon Motor Carriers (ENO Monograph Series,
2d ed 1990). See also, R. Sacasas & N.A. Glaskowsky, Motor Carrier Deregulation:A Decade of Legal and Economic Conflict, 18 Transportation Law Journal 189 (Univ of Denver
1990).
73. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v Commercial Metals Co., 456 US 336, 343
(1982).
74. As to estoppel, see for example, West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v Arcata Community Recycling Center, Inc. (cited in note 11) (citing U.S. v Western Pacific R.R. Co., 352
US 59, 76 n. 20 (1956)); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 US 59,
65 (1924). As to mistake, see for example, Western Transportation Co. v Wilson and Co.,
Inc., 682 F2d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir 1982).
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tariff applied is not properly and timely filed with the I.C.C., the
filed tariff doctrine, as we know, requires that the applicable tariff
used to calculate any undercharges must be the last tariff properly
filed by the carrier. Notice how in the following cases, carelessness
by the carrier can work an economic hardship on the shipper and
permit the carrier a windfall.
In the early 1980's, just subsequent to the formal deregulation of
the motor carrier industry, the Seventh Circuit faced the task of
enforcing the filed tariff doctrine in the new deregulated environment. Shippers and carriers watched as the Western Transportation Company, a bankrupt trucker, initiated the attack. This carrier, while marshalling its assets to satisfy its creditors, discovered
a series of executed shipping contracts wherein it had failed to
charge the shippers the correct filed tariff rates at the time of shipment - a case falling within the first group. Consequently, Western
filed a series of lawsuits using the filed tariff doctrine as the vehicle
for its complaint and seeking payment for the undercharged
freight transported.7 5
In Western Transportation Company v Wilson and Company,
Inc.,76 the carrier had agreed with the shipper to transport meat
under'a tariff applicable ". . . only when the shipment is loaded
into or onto the truck by the shipper and unloaded therefrom by
the consignee. '77 The facts accepted by the court reflected that the
shipper complied with this requirement. Unfortunately for the
shipper, however, this filed tariff also required that the bills of lading contain a notation that the consignor and consignee were to
load and unload the shipment. Western discovered that several
shipments failed to have the required notation on the bills of lading and properly sued the shipper, as required by the doctrine and
its fiduciary duty owed to its creditors, for the difference between
what it charged under this tariff and what it would have charged
under the different tariff that would have been applicable.
The trial court adopted the shipper's argument that the notation
requirement rendered the filed tariff ambiguous. The filed tariff
doctrine was, therefore, not applicable and the document was subject to the rules of interpretation and reformation like any other
contract. After taking evidence as to the intention of the parties,
75. See also, Western TransportationCo. v Webster City Iron & Metal Co., 657 F2d
116 (7th Cir 1981) and Western TransportationCo. v E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 682
F2d 1233 (7th Cir 1982).
76. 682 F2d 1227 (7th Cir 1982).
77. Western Transportation,682 F2d at 1230.
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the lower court concluded that the tariff was drafted with the intent to have the shipper pay the contracted lower rate and dismissed Western's complaint.
While sympathizing with the defendant/shipper that the filed
tariff doctrine is ".

.

. a harsh rule

'78

and admitting that Western's

recovery of these undercharges would result in unjust enrichment
by compensating the carrier for services it did not provide to the
shipper, the Seventh Circuit disagreed and strictly applied the
filed tariff doctrine. The court disputed the trial court's finding of
ambiguity in the filed tariff reasoning that if ".

.

. the duty to load

and unload and the duty to say you will load and unload were contradictory, the tariff - construed, as every document must be construed, as a whole - would be ambiguous. They are not, and it is
not. 79
Recognizing its own rule announced in National Van Lines, Inc.
v U.S.,80 that ". . . a tariff should be interpreted to avoid unjust,
absurd, or improbable results. . ." and that ". . . the practical ap-

plication of tariffs by interested persons should also be considered
in determining the meaning of the tariffs . . .,"a' the court held

that those announced principles only applied if the tariff is ambiguous. If the tariff is found to be unambiguous, as in the present
case, the parties are bound to its terms and the common-law aids
to contract construction are irrelevant. Interpretation, the court
reasoned, is permitted only when the tariff is ambiguous, so that a
literal reading is impossible.
This court, despite strictly applying the filed tariff doctrine, bridled against the inflexible standard that motor carriers are forbidden to receive different compensation from the rate fixed in an unambiguous applicable filed tariff, especially in light of the new
deregulated environment. Its discomfort was manifested by the
court outlining in its opinion a method for the defendant to circumvent its decision. The court instructed the defendant to use a
method this shipper had successfully used in the past and which
proved to be a frequently used technique during the early 1980's.
It told the shipper to request a stay from the trial court and apply
to the I.C.C. to have the offensive tariff notation provision declared
unreasonable, a right reserved to the I.C.C. under statute. The
I.C.C. had done this in the past and, apparently, was viewed as a
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id at 1229.
Id at 1230.
355 F2d 326 (7th Cir 1966).
National Van Lines, 355 F2d at 332-33.
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friendlier forum in the newly deregulated environment.12 This declaration by the I.C.C., if made, would preclude the carrier's collection of the undercharges 3 Nevertheless, in 1982, this circuit court
and the party litigants found the filed tariff doctrine still alive and
dangerous.
In 1986, the I.C.C. formalized the procedure it had been following since the early 1980's. It concluded in NITL -Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common CarrierRates
(Negotiated Rates 1)84 that changes in the motor carrier industry
".. . clearly warrant a tempering of the former harsh rule of adhering to the tariff rate in virtually all cases." ' 5 Under this new
agency policy, when cases were referred to the I.C.C., it "...
decid[ed] if the collection of undercharges would be an unreasona'
86
ble practice.
In Negotiated Rates I, the I.C.C. used as support for its decision
evidence indicating that carriers and shippers negotiated rates
lower than those filed with the I.C.C. and that the shippers paid
the negotiated rate. Frequently, the evidence showed that the negotiated rate was never filed with the I.C.C. With alarming regularity, as previously discussed, carriers were filing for bankruptcy and
the trustee billed the shipper for the difference between the tariff
rate and the negotiated rate, contending that section 10761 com87
pelled the collection of the filed rather than the negotiated rate.
The Commission decided that ". . . it could be fundamentally unfair not to consider a shipper's equitable defenses to a claim for
undercharges. ' ' 8 It reasoned that the enactment of the Motor Car82. See, Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v Western TransportationCompany, ICC Docket
No. 32521F (Sept 14, 1981). Interestingly, in this case, the Commission found the tariff to be
unambiguous but ruled it unreasonable nonetheless.
In Carriers Traffic Service, Inc. v Anderson, Clayton & Co., 881 F2d 475 (7th Cir 1989),
the court upheld several lower court rulings which affirmed the I.C.C.'s decisions disallowing
undercharges in shipper "load and count notation" cases (same as Western Transportation). The court, however, made it clear that the decision was to be construed narrowly and
did not upset the precedent set by Western Transportationbecause the case before the bar
was based upon a traditional court review of agency action (i.e. reasonableness of agency
action) rather than an initial court determination of the reasonableness of the tariff rates as
was the case in Western Transportation.
83. The court instructed that under 49 USC section 10704(a), a tariff provision is required to be reasonable. If not, it violates the statute and the I.C.C., under 49 USC section
11701, can compel compliance, i.e., vitiate the offensive clause.
84. 3 ICC2d 99 (1986).
85. Id at 106.
86. Id at 100.
87. Id at 99.
88. Id at 103.
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rier Act of 1980 justified the change in policy because the new
competitive atmosphere it created made strict application of section 10761 unnecessary to deter discrimination." Furthermore, the
Commission asserted that it had been given the power under section 10701 to decide whether the collection of the undercharge in a
specific case constituted an unreasonable practice.9 0
The I.C.C. further explained this new policy in NITL - Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates (NegotiatedRates II).1 The I.C.C. stated that its policy
did not recognize "equitable defenses," which, historically, have
been denied to shippers under case law, but instead applied the
statutory requirement of section 10701 that a carrier's practices be
reasonable.92 The Commission further explained that ". . . Negotiated Rates policy does not represent a relaxed interpretation of
section 10761, but rather a separate determination under section
10701. But even if it were viewed as a reinterpretation of a previously strict construction of section 10761, it would be . . . well
within this agency's authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the
Interstate Commerce Act, based on upon experience gained and
''
changing circumstances. 19
89. Id at 106.
90. Id at 103. The I.C.C. further stated that Negotiated Rates I did not"... abrogate
Section 10761. Rather we emphasize that carriers must continue to charge the tariff rate as
provided in the statute. The issue here is simply whether we have the authority to consider
all the circumstances surrounding an undercharge suit." Id at 103. Interestingly, the I.C.C.
refused in Negotiated Rates I to declare that a negotiated rate be considered the maximum
reasonable rate. It found that this notion conflicted with section 10761 because it created a
"... per se determination that, as a matter of law, the negotiated rate would apply." Id at
102.
91. 5 ICC2d 623 (1989).
92. Id at 631.
93. 5 ICC2d 623, 631 (1989).
In August, 1989, a U.S. bankruptcy court in St. Paul, Minnesota, ruled that 29 undercharge cases involving Murphy Motor Freight, Inc. should be referred to the I.C.C. for a
ruling on the reasonableness of the rates involved. Schultz, 219 Traffic World 14 (August 28,
1989).
Recently, the Commission, on a referred case from a Tennessee state circuit court, ruled
that a negotiated rate agreed upon by both parties would be enforced notwithstanding a
different filed tariff rate and declared the filed tariff rate unreasonable solely by virtue of its
inconsistency with the negotiated rate. This decision, Sunshine Mills Inc. v Rebel Motor
FreightInc., MCC 30140 (July 31, 1989), further evidenced the aggressive strategy pursued
by the I.C.C. throughout the 1980's of declaring filed tariff rates unreasonable in light of
different negotiated rates, thereby eroding the efficacy of the filed tariff doctrine before the
I.C.C.. In another Tennessee case referred to the I.C.C. involving Rebel Motor Freight Inc.,
the Commission again held that it would be an unreasonable practice for shippers to pay
additional undercharges in negotiated rate cases. Ideal Chemical and Supply Co. v Rebel
Motor Freight Inc., MCC 30139 (August 21, 1989). See also, B&B Beverage Co. v Eazor
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In early 1989, the Fifth Circuit dealt with the second proto-typical undercharge claim under the filed tariff doctrine: a failure to
file with the I.C.C. the tariff rate contracted for with the shipper as
required by statute. In the Matter of CaravanRefrigerated Cargo,
Inc., " the court reviewed what it described as an "archetypal negotiated rate case." 95 A shipper had a long-standing agreement with
Caravan, a refrigerated transport carrier, that Caravan would
"meet or beat" any motor carrier rate quoted by a competing carrier. During their relationship, the shipper and Caravan negotiated
rates to assure competitiveness. Caravan billed the shipper for the
contracted rates and the shipper paid. The rates charged, however,
were not the same rates which Caravan had filed with the I.C.C.
The rates properly filed with the Commission were higher than the
contracted rates. The shipper contended that it was unaware of the
variance and relied upon Caravan's rate quotations. Caravan filed
for bankruptcy and its trustee filed an action to recover the difference between the negotiated rates and the filed tariff rates.
Unlike the defendant in Western- Transportation, this shipper
attempted to have the case referred to the friendly confines of the
I.C.C. for a determination of the reasonableness of the filed rates,
arguing the ". . . primary jurisdiction doctrine."9 The district
court refused to refer the case to the I.C.C.97 and, further, did not
Special Services Inc., MCC 30137 (August 21, 1989).
This course of action appeared to be the Commission's method of implementing what it
perceived to be Congress' intent with respect to deregulation of rates without actually legislatively abrogating the doctrine. It has been reported that Rep. Glenn Anderson (D Calif)
has stated his intent to introduce legislation which will require that all undercharge cases be
considered by the I.C.C. before they can be sent to bankruptcy court. This solution is allegedly being pursued because it appears unclear whether judicial action would produce uniform results. Schultz, 219 Traffic World 14 (August 28, 1989).
94. 864 F2d 388 (5th Cir 1989), rehearing denied en banc, 869 F2d 1487 (5th Cir 1989).
95. Id at 388.
96. See for example, City of New Orleans v Southern Scrap Material Co. Ltd., 704
F2d 755, 758 (5th Cir 1983) and I.C.C. v Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 383 US 576, 579 (1966)
wherein the doctrine that ". . . a district court trying a case arising under the Interstate
Commerce Act must, if presented with such an issue, stay its proceedings and refer the case
to the Commission" was presented. Further, the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled that
when the reasonableness of the rate is'at issue, ". . . there must be a preliminary resort to
the Commission." Southern Pacific TransportationCo. v City of San Antonio, 748 F2d 266,
272 (5th Cir 1984) (quoting Great Northern Ry. v Merchants Elevator Co., 259 US 285, 291
(1922)).
97. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is applicable whenever the enforcement of a
claim subject to a specific regulatory .scheme requires resolution of issues that. are "...
within the special competence of an administrative body." United States v Western Pacific
R.R. Co., 352 US 59, 64 (1956). This doctrine has its origins in the famous case of Texas &
Pacific R.R. v Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 US 426 (1907), where the Supreme Court adopted
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accept the shipper's argument, filed in opposition to Caravan's motion for summary judgment, that if the matter was not referred to
the I.C.C. for determination the trial court should rule that the
tariff rate was unreasonable.
In another strong reaffirmation of the filed tariff doctrine, the
Fifth Circuit deftly disposed of the shipper's arguments for referral. While recognizing the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit
court agreed with the district court that the facts of this case did
not -raise any "...
technical or complex issues . . . that require
the expert administration of the Commission ... 98 The court so
ruled because the shipper's "unreasonableness" argument was bottomed solely on the charge that having to pay the filed rate because Caravan ". . . failed to get its paperwork done . . ."" would
be unfair. Accordingly, the court reasoned that under the facts and
arguments presented the filed tariff doctrine gave clear guidance
and there was no need for referral.
Second, the court refused to accept the shipper's contention that
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 abrogated the filed tariff doctrine.
The court reasoned that despite the intent of the Act, i.e., economic deregulation of the motor carrier industry, Congress had examined the area thoroughly when the legislation was being enacted
and did nothing to eliminate or limit this long-standing doctrine.
The Congress, the court reasoned, by its inaction apparently intended to leave the filed tariff doctrine intact. 10 0
Further, in an apparent blow to the persuasiveness of I.C.C.
opinions before the circuit court, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply
the Commission's advisory opinion which the court viewed as allowing equitable defenses in disputes regarding reasonableness of
the view that shippers seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the established rate must primarily invoke redress through the I.C.C. It has come to mean that
the I.C.C. has jurisdiction over matters of fact and administrative matters; however, if words
are used in their ordinary sense, introduction of evidence is unnecessary and the courts need
not refer the matter to the I.C.C. See, Farley Transportation Co., Inc. v Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 778 F2d 1365 (9th Cir 1985) where the court also refused to refer a
tariff question to the I.C.C.; and Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v Valley
Freight Systems, Inc., 856 F2d 546 (3d Cir 1988) where the filed tariff doctrine was enforced
and the court did not refer.
98. Caravan, 864 F2d at 388, 389-90.
99. Id at 390.
100. The court cited, by analogy, the Supreme Court's refusal to overturn doctrine
established prior to the Motor Carrier Act which Congress did not expressly abrogate. Id at
391 (citing Square D Co. v Niagara FrontierTariff Bureau, 476 US 409 (1986) and Keogh v
Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 US 156 (1922)).
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rates.'0 1 Although the I.C.C. might soften and permit shippers to
escape from the filed tariff doctrine, the Fifth Circuit would have
none of it. If the doctrine was to be nullified, the court sent the
message that it would have to be Congress that would have to do
it.
Finally, the court distinguished a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion, Seaboard System R.R. v U.S.,10 2 which had recognized the
Commission's authority to find that misquotation of rates constitutes unreasonable practice under the statute. The court explained
that in Seaboard, the Commission had determined that the tariff
' ' °3
sought to be enforced was not ". . . plain to the ordinary user. 1
Since the shipper in this case had not claimed nor offered any evidence that rates filed by Caravan were not plain to the ordinary
user, the Seaboard precedent was inapplicable and there was,
therefore, no discord between the circuits.
In mid-July, 1989, the Eighth Circuit fired a salvo on behalf of
the shippers in a ruling diametrically opposed to that made by the
Fifth Circuit in Caravan. In Maislin Industries, Inc. v Primary
Steel, Inc., °4 the Eighth Circuit faced the issue of Whether the
filed tariff doctrine obligated Primary Steel, Inc. to pay Maislin
Industries, Inc. an amount greater than that which the parties negotiated. The case arose from an action by Maislin Industries, Inc.
to recover freight undercharges for over one thousand interstate
shipments performed for Primary Steel by Maislin's subsidiary,
Quinn Freight Lines, an interstate motor carrier. From 1981 to
1983, Quinn negotiated rates with Primary that were lower than
Quinn's filed rates. Quinn failed to file the negotiated rates as required by the I.C.C.
In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and an audit of its accounts revealed undercharges of $187,923.36 resulting from billing
Primary at the negotiated rather than the required filed rates.
Maislin's trustees in bankruptcy billed Primary for the undercharges. Primary refused to pay and the bankrupt estate
brought suit under 49 USC section 11706(a) for the difference between the filed rates and the negotiated rates.
101. 864 F2d at 391 (citing National Industrial Transportation League-Petitionto
Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common CarrierRates, 3 ICC2d 99 (1986)).
102. 794 F2d 635 (11th Cir 1986). Seaboard held that "finding a carrier practice unreasonable is the kind of determination that lies in the primary jurisdiction of the Commission." Id at 638.
103. Id at 637.
104. 879 F2d 400 (8th Cir 1989).
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In its answer, Primary contended, inter alia, that since the parties had negotiated lower rates, collecting the tariff rates would
constitute an unreasonable practice in violation of section 10701,
and that the tariff rates themselves were not "reasonable" within
the meaning of the statute. The district court, finding these matters to be within the primary jurisdiction of the I.C.C., stayed the
proceeding at Primary's request and referred the case to the
Commission.
The I.C.C. ruled in Primary's favor, relying upon Negotiated
Rates I and rejecting Maislin's argument that the Commission
lacked the statutory power to release a shipper from liability for
such undercharges. The Commission found that Quinn and Primary had negotiated rates other than the tariff rates and that Primary had relied on Quinn to file the rates with the I.C.C. Since the
I.C.C. felt that Primary reasonably believed that the amounts
quoted and billed by Quinn were the correct total charges for the
transportation services it performed, that the amounts were
reached as the result of negotiations between Primary and Quinn,
and that full payment was made by Primary, Maislin was not entitled to recover the filed rates.
The case returned to the district court where both parties moved
for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for
Primary, rejecting Maislin's argument that the I.C.C.'s new policy
was, in effect, an impermissible recognition of equitable defenses to
the application of the filed rate. The district court held that the
I.C.C.'s policy of determining case-by-case whether the collection
of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice under section
10701 was based on a permissible construction of the Act.' 05 On
appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Maislin challenged the district court's
referral of the issue to the I.C.C. and its subsequent affirmance of
the I.C.C. decision.
First, the circuit court upheld the district court's reliance on the
primary jurisdiction doctrine in referring the questions of whether
Maislin's freight rates and charges were unreasonable and whether
Maislin's practice of assessing and rebilling Primary Steel for tariff
rates higher than those originally negotiated by the parties constituted an unreasonable practice in violation of 49 USC section
10701(a) to the I.C.C.
As outlined previously, upon receiving the referral, the I.C.C. relied upon its earlier decision in NITL-Petition to Institute
105.

705 F Supp 1401, 1405-06 (W D Mo 1988).
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Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common CarrierRates (Negotiated Rates 1)106 and held that it could inquire into whether the
imposition of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice
under section 10701(a). The I.C.C. then found that Maislin had
quoted a rate other than a tariff rate to Primary Steel, that an
agreement had been reached between the parties, and that Primary Steel had, in fact, reasonably relied on the rate quotation.
The I.C.C. concluded that Maislin would commit an unreasonable
practice in requiring Primary Steel to pay undercharges for the
difference between the negotiated rates and the tariff rates. The
district court left the I.C.C.'s findings intact and the Eighth Circuit, unlike the Fifth, agreed.
Further, and of greatest significance, the circuit court ruled that
the district court properly rejected the applicability of the filed
tariff doctrine because of the I.C.C. policy change announced in
Negotiated Rates J.107 As outlined previously, Negotiated Rates I
permits the I.C.C., upon a court's request, to determine whether
the collection of undercharges would constitute an unreasonable
practice under section 10701. The district court observed that the
I.C.C. had not abolished the requirement that mandates carriers to
charge the tariff rate. Rather, the I.C.C. changed its policy on enforcing the "unreasonable practice" provision of section 10701(a),
by allowing the consideration of equitable defenses. The district
court held that nothing prohibits the I.C.C. from changing its policy and that this change in policy was justified and consistent with
its practices under the Interstate Commerce Act.108 Again, the circuit court agreed. The split between the Eighth and Fifth Circuits
was irreparable.10 9 The U.S. Supreme Court quickly granted certio106. 3 ICC2d 99 (1986).
107. Id.
108. The Ninth Circuit in West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F2d
1016 (9th Cir 1990) agreed with the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit and held that the question whether a carrier's negotiated rate practices are reasonable should be decided first by
the I.C.C. It then went on to decide that the I.C.C.'s recent refusal to adhere strictly to the
filed rate doctrine is consistent with congressional intent. The court observed that the 1980
Motor Common Carrier Act relaxed the regulatory environment and that the I.C.C.'s easing
of the burden on shippers to discover the myriad of filed tariffs is a practical response. It
also said the I.C.C.'s new policy will prevent carriers from engaging in unfair competitive
practices.
109. A recently decided case reaffirmed the Eighth Circuit's commitment to the reasoning in Maislin, accord, INF, Ltd. v Spectro Alloys Corp., 881 F2d 546 (8th Cir 1989).
The Second and Ninth Circuits have also agreed with the Maislin rationale, see, Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v Appco Paper& Plastics Corp., 893 F2d 472 (2d Cir 1990) and West Coast
Truck Lines, Inc. v Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F2d 1016 (9th Cir 1990). The First Circuit recently joined the majority in holding that the question of reasonableness of rates should be
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rari to review Maislin.11 0
referred to the I.C.C. under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v
Transtop, Inc., 1990 US App LEXIS 6272 (1st Cir 1990). The Seventh Circuit in Orschelin
Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F2d 642 (7th Cir 1990) also joined the
majority opinion and stated its position as follows:
Strict, mechanical adherence to the filed-rate doctrine produces absurd results well
illustrated by the present case. The carrier and the shipper negotiated a mutually
attractive rate. The carrier told the shipper that the rate was in a tariff that it had
just filed. The shipper could have checked, because there are "watching services" to
which one can subscribe that check the tariff filings in the Commission every day.
But the shipper did not consult a watching service and through some inadvertence
the carrier neglected to file the tariff. .. The shipments were made, and the shipper
paid the agreed-on price, which it believed was the tariffed price. Years passed. The
carrier went broke. The trustee in bankruptcy-unconcerned about the effects on
customer good will of suing for undercharges, because the carrier was being liquidated-combed through the carrier's invoices, looking for deviations from the tariffed
rates. This is a pastime of trustees of bankrupt carriers. [Citation omitted.] The trustee found that the tariff which the shipper had thought the carrier had filed had not
been filed, and he brought this suit.
The suit serves no social -purpose, yet Congress has not amended section 10761(a),
which by stating that carriers shall price only in accordance with their filed tariffs (a
"carrier may not charge or receive a different compensation ... than the rate specified in the tariff") enacts, in the view of the carrier, the filed-rate doctrine. The Interstate Commerce Commission has no authority to repeal a section in an Act of Congress, even if Congress itself would surely have done so had it realized how the
section interacted with the amendments it was making to the Act. But this is not
what the Commission has done. Section 10761(a) does not enact the filed-rate doctrine. It does require pricing in accordance with published tariffs, but it does not
prescribe the consequences if the parties deviate from the tariff by mistake. It is the
filed-rate doctrine that prescribes them, and the doctrine emanates not from section
10761(a) alone but also from the requirement in sections 10701(a) and 10704(a)(1)
that a carrier's practices be reasonable. The Commission has not modified any statute. It has modified a Commission-made doctrine by holding that the carrier who
leads the shipper to believe that there was a tariff on file covering the agreed shipment at the agreed price will be estopped to contend otherwise-will in other words
be guilty of an unreasonable practice. . .Section 10761(a) creates the basic prohibition, but it is left to the Commission, in the exercise of its broad discretionary powers
under the reasonable-practice provisions of the Transportation Code, to shape the
remedy for violations of the prohibition. It is in failing to consider the interplay between section 10761(a), which requires pricing in accordance with filed tariffs, and
sections 10701(a) and 10704(a), which require carriers to adhere to reasonable practices, that the Fifth Circuit went astray (we respectfully suggest) in In re Caravan
Refigerated Cargo, Inc. [citation omitted], the case that created an intercircuit conflict on the validity of the Commission's new approach to filed-rate questions. The
Fifth Circuit treated the filed-rate doctrine as an interpretation of section 10761(a)
that the Supreme Court had, by approving, placed beyond power of change by the
Commission, by a lower federal court, or perhaps by any body other than Congress.
But all that section 10761(a) requires is pricing according to filed tariffs. The proposition that a deviation from such pricing, however innocent, should exact from the
shipper the forfeiture of his bargain in any and all circumstances is an interpretation
of the concept of a "reasonable practice," a concept the provenance of which is section 10701(a) rather than 10761(a).
110. 110 S Ct 834 (1990).
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Unquestionably, the reported federal circuit court cases since
1980 reflected that the filed tariff doctrine had collided head on
with the observable result of motor carrier deregulation: the shakeout of several thousand motor carriers since 1980, many of them
bankrupt. A review of these federal circuit court decisions revealed
that, although the courts had taken cognizance of the impact of
deregulation, there was disagreement among the circuits whether
to accept the I.C.C.'s Negotiated Rates position, and therefore,
render inert the filed tariff doctrine, or to follow announced precedent which had stood vigil over the transportation industry for
nearly three-quarters of a century. The industry awaited the resolution of the conflict between the Eighth Circuit, which had been
joined by the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and the Fifth
Circuit.
They did not have to wait very long. On June 21, 1990, barely
two months after oral argument, the Supreme. Court ruled; shippers who had been sleeping soundly, relying on the I.C.C.'s recent
favorable holdings as well as the support of a majority of the circuit courts for their position, awakened to their worst nightmare.
Justice Brennan struck the blow in the first paragraph of the
opinion:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (1982
ed.), motor common carriers must file their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or. Commission), and both carriers and shippers
must adhere to these rates. This case requires us to determine the validity
of a policy recently adopted by the ICC that relieves a shipper of the obligation of paying the filed rate when the shipper and carrier have privately
negotiated a lower rate. We hold that this policy is inconsistent with the
1
Act." '

The Court's opinion methodically reviewed the public policy,
statutory and case law foundation of the filed tariff doctrine. Recalling and reflecting upon precedents set over the last seven decades,11 2 Justice Brennan reminded the parties that the duty to file
rates under the statute, as well as the obligation to charge only
those rates filed, had always been viewed by the Court as indispensable in preventing the price discrimination which is the statute's
111. Maislin Industries, Inc. v Primary Steel, Inc., -US
-, 110 S Ct 2759, 2762
(1990).
112. The Court cites at pp 2766-67 of the opinion: Arizona Grocery Co. v Atchison, T.
& S. F. R. Co., 284 US 370, 384 (1932); Keogh v Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 US
156, 163 (1922); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v Mugg, 202 US 242, 245, (1906) [statute forbids
equitable defenses to collection of filed tariff]; and, of course, Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v Maxwell, 237 US 94, 97 (1915).
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raison d'etre. 113 The Court spoke to the issue as follows:
Compliance with sections 10761 and 10762 is "utterly central" to the administration of the Act . . . "Without [these provisions] . . . it would be
monumentally difficult to enforce the requirement that rates be reasonable
and nondiscriminatory, . . . and virtually impossible for the public to assert
its right to challenge the lawfulness of existing proposed rates." [Citations
omitted.] Although the ICC argues that the Negotiated Rates policy does
not "abolis[h] the requirement in section 10761 that carriers must continue
to charge the tariff rate,... " the policy, by sanctioning adherence to unfiled rates, undermines the basic structure of the Act. The ICC cannot review in advance the reasonableness of un/iled rates. Likewise, other shippers cannot know if they should challenge a carrier's rates as discriminatory
when many of the carrier's rates are privately negotiated and never disclosed to the ICC. Thus, although we agree that the Commission may have
discretion to craft appropriate remedies for violations of the statute, . . .
the "remedy" articulated in the Negotiated Rates policy effectively renders
nugatory the requirements of §§ 10761 and 10762 and conflicts directly with
the core purposes of the Act."'

Next, the Court took on the Commission's argument that a carrier engages in an "unreasonable practice" when it attempts to col-

lect the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower rate
and, therefore, the Commission has the authority under the statute
and Maxwell to declare the filed tariff unenforceable. The Court,
in refusing to accept the Commission's premise, again reflected on
the historical public policy underpinnings of the filed tariff doctrine and demolished the Commission's carefully constructed position announced in Negotiated Rates:
The filed rate doctrine, however, contains an important caveat: the filed
rate is not enforceable if the ICC finds the rate to be unreasonable . . . The
filed rate doctrine, therefore, follows from the requirement that only filed
rates be collected, . . . the requirement that rates not be discriminatory,
. . . and the requirement. . . that carriers adopt reasonable rates and practices . . . [Citations omitted.] In the instant case, the Commission did not
find that the rates were unreasonable but rather concluded that the carrier
had engaged in an unreasonable practice in violation of section 10701 that
should preclude it from collecting the filed rates. The Commission argues
that under the filed rate doctrine, a finding that the carrier engaged in an
unreasonable practice should, like a finding that the filed rate is unreasonable, disentitle the carrier to collection of the filed rate. We have never held
that a carrier's unreasonable practice justifies departure from the filed tariff
schedule. [Citations omitted.] But we need not resolve this issue today because we conclude that the justification for departure from the filed tariff
schedule that the ICC set forth in its Negotiated Rates policy rests on an
113.
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interpretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and structure of
the statute as a whole and the requirements that make up the filed rate
doctrine in particular . . .Under the Negotiated Rates policy, the ICC has
determined that a carrier engages in an unreasonable practice when it attempts to collect the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower rate.
The ICC argues that its conclusion is entitled to deference because section
10701 does not specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered unreasonable and because its construction is rational and consistent
with the statute. [Citations omitted.] We disagree. For a century, this Court
has held that the Act, as it incorporates the filed rate doctrine, forbids as
discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates lower than the
filed rate . . .By refusing to order collection of the filed rate solely because
the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very price
discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent . - . Congress has not
diverged from this interpretation and we decline to revisit it ourselves . . .
Stripped of its semantic cover, the Negotiated Rates policy and, more specifically, the Commission's interpretation of "unreasonable practices" thus
stand revealed as flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole
and sections 10761 and 10762 in particular. [Citations omitted.]" 5

Next and finally, the Court took aim upon the Commission's argument that the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 justified
its policy set in Negotiated Rates I & II. Again, the Supreme
Court said no to the I.C.C.:
The ICC maintains, however, that the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of
1980 (MCA), justifies its Negotiated Rates policy. The MCA substantially
deregulated the motor carrier industry in many ways in an effort to "promote competitive and efficient transportation services." [Citations omitted.]
In addition to loosening entry controls,. . . the MCA also created a zone of
reasonableness within which carriers can raise rates without interference
from the ICC . . .More importantly, the MCA also allows motor carriers to
operate as both common carriers and contract carriers. [Citations omitted.]
A contract carrier transports property under exclusive agreements with a
shipper, . . . and the Commission has exempted all motor contract carriers
from the requirements of §§ 10761 and 10762. . .The Commission has also
relaxed the regulations relating to motor common carriers, most significantly, by allowing decreased rates to go into effect one day after the filing
of a tariff . . .In Negotiated Rates I and H, the Commission concluded
that in light of the more competitive environment, strict adherence to the
filed rate doctrine "is inappropriate and unnecessary to deter discrimination
today." According to the Commission, "the inability of a shipper to rely on
a carrier's interpretation of a tariff is a greater evil than the remote possibility that a carrier might intentionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to
discriminate illegally between shippers." [Citations omitted.] .. .
We reject this argument. Although the Commission has both the authority
and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with new develop-
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ments in the industry [citations omitted], it does not have the power to
adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its governing statute. Nothing in
the MCA repeals §§ 10761 and 10762 or casts doubt on our prior interpretation of those sections. Generalized congressional exhortations to "increase
competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to alter the well-established
statutory filed rate requirements. As we said in Square D Co. v Niagara
Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., with respect to a similarly longstanding judicial interpretation of the Act: "Congress must be presumed to have been
fully cognizant of this interpretation of the statutory scheme, which had
been a significant part of our settled law for over half a century, and . . .
Congress did not see fit to change it when Congress carefully reexamined
this area of the law in 1980. [Respondent has] pointed to no specific statutory provision or legislative history indicating a specific congressional intention to overturn the longstanding . . . construction; harmony with the general legislative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task." [Citations
omitted.]1 ' 6

The repercussions of the Supreme Court's decision in Maislin
will be profound. Shippers, most of whom are financially solvent,
have lost their immunity from undercharge liability. They will
have to pay. As presented previously, the statistics indicate that
the bill may run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Motor carriers, a substantial number of them already bankrupt, have
had their balance sheets injected with heretofore uncollectible accounts receivable. Although too late for many carriers, their creditors must be gloating as they prepare to pick up all the chips in
this high stakes poker game. The proponents and would-be enforcers of deregulation may ultimately be the biggest losers. Presently,
they can do little else but lick their wounds, reflect on what went
wrong and plan how to approach an American public and a Congress much less enamored with the idea of deregulation today than
in 1980.

A

LOOK FORWARD: SYNTHESIS AND PERSPECTIVE

Prior to the deregulation movement, filed tariff rates reflected
the stability of the transportation industry. Rates moved slowly in
a market which saw only moderate competition. If a carrier
stepped out of line and charged it's favorite shipper lower freight
rates than those filed with the I.C.C., the filed tariff doctrine was
there to quickly remedy the breach of discipline. Deregulation,
however, sent a message which stated that unfettered competition,
especially in the area of rates, was the new order. Unfortunately,
Congress failed to recognize the inherent conflict between deregu116.
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lation and the filed tariff doctrine. As one circuit court eloquently
stated:
Recent legislation moving toward modified deregulation . . . (involving
greater reliance on competitive forces) might suggest the need for a second
look at policies requiring strict adherence to filed tariffs .. .Greater rate
flexibility, for example, might seem appropriate where competitive forces
are at work and monopoly or [monopolistic] power has abated. However,
Congress has not yet amended the Act to permit greater flexibility . . . and
we are unwilling to engage in deregulation by adjudication." 7

For reasons unclear, Congress did not repeal or modify the statute which legislatively supports the filed tariff doctrine to reflect
the new deregulatory order. The I.C.C., at least in the motor carrier industry, attempted to fashion the escape mechanism Congress
had failed to legislate. The Supreme Court quickly disposed of that
method in Maislin.
Prior to the decision in Maislin, one could argue that the filed
tariff doctrine was living on borrowed time. Unquestionably, that
conviction can no longer be sustained. Will the Maislin decision be
used to impose consistency among the circuits regarding the application of the filed tariff doctrine in the other component parts of
the transportation industry? One can speculate that it will. The
filed tariff doctrine appears stronger than ever. Accordingly, if
118
there is going to be a change, Congress will have to make it.
While it ponders the future, Congress should reflect on Sebastian's
admonition to Antonio in Twelfth Night and either undo the burden imposed by the filed tariff doctrine or anticipate that its deregulatory legislative will may be occasionally thwarted by the continued enforcement of a doctrine from a long passed regulatory
period in the economic history of the United States.

117.

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F2d 683, 690 (1984).

118.

Since the Maislin decision, 'shippers have marshalled an effort to petition Con-

gress for legislative relief from the undercharge claims. On July 31, 1990, the Senate Commerce Committee reported S. 2933, a bill introduced by Senator J. James Exon, which attempts to ameliorate the effects of the Court's ruling. The legislation received fierce
opposition from creditors, including the Teamsters Pension Fund, and its passage appears
in serious doubt during the 101st session of Congress.

